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A Retrospeetive
on the Criminal Trial Jury,
1200-1800
Thomas A. Green

My recent book1 provided an overview of the history of the institu
tional aspects of the English criminal trial jury upon which all of the
contributors to this volume have, tacitly or otherwise, commented.
That tentative institutional background was intended both to stand
on its own terms and to provide a framework for the studies on the
relationship between law and society and on the history of ideas re
garding the jury that made up the larger part of the volume.2 The two
aspects of my book were joined: the socio-legal analysis and the his
tory of ideas were to a large extent founded upon my arguments about
the institutional setting of the jury. The relatively brief institutional
overview thus played a crucial role. The preceding essays present new
information that supersedes both my own tentative soundings on in
stitutional matters and my syntheses of existing scholarship in that
area. Little of my earlier work on institutional problems-jury com
position and the like-remains exactly as it was before. Parts of that
foundation have been shattered; here and there beams sag; some walls
have, I am glad to say, actually been reinforced. In this essay I shall
assess the present shape of the structure, following a roughly chrono
logical approach, and, as I did in the conclusion to my earlier work, I
shall indicate some matters that particularly require further investi
gation. My task is to provide an overview of the preceding essays, per
haps even to bring some unity to them, as I view them in relation to
my own work. In particular, I shall emphasize the implications of
these studies of jury composition for three problems central not only
1.

Green, Verdict According to Conscience.

2. For the institutional background, see chaps. 1, 4, and 7 (sec. l); for a social
and legal analysis and the history of ideas, see chaps. 2, 3, 5, 61 7 (secs. 2-4), and 8.
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to the history of the English criminal trial jury but also to the history
of the administration of the English criminal law generally. These
problems involve ( 1 ) the way in which the medieval jury was in
formed and reached its verdict; (2) the degree and the form of the in
dependence that the early-modern jury enjoyed at a time when the
powers of the bench were very great; and (3) the role of the eighteenth
century trial jury, which, although clearly independent, was, by virtue
of the status and experiences of its members, arguably a mere exten
sion of the bench.
First, a precis of the institutional side of my published history of the
jury. My earlier work suggested that the criminal trial jury emerged
somewhat accidentally in about the year 1220, toward the end of what
I have called the Angevin transformation of the criminal law and its
administration. That transformation involved a shift from private to
public prosecution and from predominantly private resolution
through monetary compensation to predominantly capital punish
ment at the hands of the Crown. The presenting jury, dating from at
least as early as the latter half of the twelfth century, exercised some
significant discretion as it determined who must undergo the ordeal,
the existing means of providing the proof normally required for con
viction. In so doing, it reflected, broadly, communal attitudes about
the sorts of persons who ought to suffer capital punishment or the
sorts of offenses for which persons ought to suffer such punishment.
After 1220 the trial jury, reflecting similar attitudes and diverging
from standards set by the Crown-standards that the bench stood
ready to enforce-played a similar role.
The trial jury's power to implement that role derived mainly from
the fact that the bench was dependent upon the jury for information
regarding the circumstances of presented offenses and the credibility
of persons presented. I stressed the jury's role in the offense of homi
cide, but I also extrapolated outward to theft. I did not deal with the
rarer offenses of treason, counterfeiting, rape, and arson. Implicitly, I
excluded appeals, which were still mainly private prosecutions that
continued to come into the royal courts, although in relatively small
numbers.
In my interpretive overview of the administration of the criminal
law in the medieval period, I argued that the centerpiece of the trial
was the colloquy between judge and defendant. I left little room for
other prosecution or defense testimony at the trial. The jury, I sug
gested, was influenced by the demeanor and responses of the defend
ant, which provided in-court evidence that it viewed in the context of
what it already knew, or suspected, about the defendant, the alleged
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offense, and the community's view of just deserts in the case at hand.
The bench must have been aware that the jury departed from the strict
rules of law in many cases involving homicide and theft. There is
some evidence that judges occasionally questioned jurors, even
pushed them hard, but little evidence that the bench succeeded in
overturning jury domination of the resolution of most cases. At least
in the law of homicide, legal change appears to have taken account of
jury practices, and such change, along with the obvious willingness of
juries to apply the law strictly in cases that the bench deemed most
serious, encouraged judicial acquiescence in-and sympathy with
jury-based mercy in the less serious felonies. Over time, then, the
bench assimilated popular attitudes even while it sought greater con
trol over a system that it could not yet effectively monitor, much less
definitively control.
As I formerly viewed the matter, the Tudor period witnessed devel
opments that dramatically shifted the balance of power in the court
room. Although some of these developments began in the later Mid
dle Ages-most significantly the expansion of benefit of clergy and
the investigative activity of the justices of the peace-the confluence
of legal, political, and social change made for a great leap forward dur
ing the middle to late decades of the sixteenth century. These changes
involved, inter alia, the long-term decline of the self-informing jury;
the taking of depositions from the accuser, prosecution witnesses, and
the accused; alterations in substantive law that reduced the distance
between formal legal rules and social attitudes; and recourse to the
Court of Star Chamber, or to fining by the assize judges themselves,
to discourage jury recalcitrance. The resulting shift of control to the
bench, I argued, nonetheless had limits. Had the bench not adhered to
the application of legal rules in a manner that at least roughly met
with approbation on the part of much of society, it might have failed
to have its way. Considerations of time and bureaucratic capacities, as
well as uncertainty about gaining convictions in some cases, underlay
a judicial willingness to compromise, perhaps in return for a guilty
plea. Moreover, the perception on the part of jurors and the wider
community may well have been that the community shared with the
bench the power of mitigation and absolute condemnation. A signifi
cant reduction in the number of acquittals and verdicts of self-defense
was complemented by an increase in the number of convictions on
charges that left the defendant eligible for benefit of clergy, a punish
ment that was sufficiently modest (branding and, after 1576, the pos
sibility of one year's imprisonment) for jurors to consider themselves
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merciful and for the bench occasionally to resort to withholding the
privilege from those who in fact could satisfy the reading test.
By the eighteenth century, a much more substantial punishment
had come to replace the sanction of branding in many cases: transpor
tation. Although I did not explain the process in detail, I suggested
that by then the jury had largely been "tamed," albeit in part because
of the increasingly evident concurrence of the bench with what I
termed "widespread community-based attitudes." Even the rule in
Bushel's Case ( 1671) that the bench could not punish or threaten to
punish jurors (except where true criminal fraud, contempt, or breach
of administrative rules had been proved) did not often put the bench
on the defensive. Judge and jury operated in tandem, efficiently and
within a context wherein they conditioned each other's responses.
Not that the system suited the needs of all parties at all times. There
were cases-11political11 in nature-where the bench sought tighter
control of juries but found that the everyday practices in which the
bench acquiesced provided an argument against that control. More
over, there were critics of both capital sanctions and of a multi-level
system of discretion who argued that certainty and proportionality of
punishment were vital for deterrence. Reform of the law of sanctions
in the nineteenth century not only greatly reduced recourse to the de
vice of reprieve and pardon, it also reduced much of the by then highly
"managed" jury law-finding that was, I argued, traceable ultimately to
the early thirteenth century.

It has long been conventional to date the criminal trial jury from
about 1220. In recent years we have learned a good deal about the
proto-juries of the period 1166--1220 that gave medial verdicts, the de
fendant who was thereby "convicted" being ordered to undergo the
ordeal, to abjure the realm, or to face his accuser in combat. No one
has contributed more to our learning in this regard than Roger Groot.3
Groot has now analyzed the process by which, in the course of several
years, such proto-juries paved the way for a criminal trial jury that
gave final verdicts, the defendant thereby convicted being condemned
to death on the gallows.4 His work allows us to draw some impor
tant-albeit tentative-inferences regarding the relationship between
3. R. D. Groot, "The Jury of Presentment before 1 2 15," AfLH 26 ( 1982): 1-24;
idem, "The Jury in Private Criminal Prosecutions before 1 2 1 5," AfLH 27 ( 1983): 1 1341.
4.

See above, chap. 1 .
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jury composition, the setting of the earliest criminal jury trials, and
the manner in which "self-informing" came to be a natural aspect of
trial jury process.
Groot takes the view that practically from the outset of the trial
jury period the bench accepted final verdicts with little question. He
does not attempt directly to explain why such great power was thus
posited in the hands of the lay community. He certainly does not in
voke the traditional view that the jury was in some sense, like its im
mediate predecessor the ordeal, a surrogate for the voice of God. One
level of implicit explanation seems to be that proto-juries had given
untrammeled verdicts when merely medial issues were involved, and
this practice was then generalized to final verdicts in some natural
fashion. At another level, the explanation may be that the post-1 220
trial jury was an administrative expedient for which, in theory, the ac
tual consent of the suspect was required. The bench conditioned
"consent" by requiring a choice between jury trial and harsh impris
onment (what became the infamous peine-not prisone-forte et
dure) and then induced consent to trial by hundredors and members
of the four neighboring vills by forcing nonconsenting suspects to be
tried by the hundredors and a body of knights. Thus the authorities
achieved nearly universal consent to trial by jury by establishing the
more attractive local jury as the common means of proof. It was, in
fact, the most logical candidate, for its members-at least those from
the vills-were the best informed both about the offense charged and
about the suspect's reputation generally. Presumably the hundredors,
who had presented the suspect in the first place and who were men of
higher standing with less investment in the interests-and preju
dices-of the local community, would minimize the possibility of
frivolous acquittal or conviction.
From the evidence Groot has marshaled, it appears that at the very
outset the jury was forced on persons who were strongly suspected of
serious offenses: the use of the jury, Groot shows, must be seen in re
lation to the extraordinary royal order of 1 2 1 9.5 A substantial number
of the first persons to be tried by jury, being among the most serious
offenders, were thus convicted, a circumstance that may have made
jury trial all the more attractive to the authorities. As jury trial came
to be the standard method of trial, however, defendants of all sorts put
their lives upon the country, with-we might now think-predictable
results. Jury trial very soon became a test of popular views on life and
death that imperfectly mirrored the more abstract "letter of the law."
5.

See above, chap. 1, text at n. 2 1 .

A Retrospective
363
To the extent that Groot distinguishes knights, substantialhundred
ors, the vill reeve, and men from the vill, he writes about jury com
position and the relationship between that composition and the na
ture of trial. Representatives of the vill came to play a crucial role:
their assent was typically required for a conviction. This should not
blind us to the fact that such persons had long played a significant role
in providing the evidence upon which presentments were based;
doubtless, hundred jurors (presenters) did not translate the general
suspicion they were bound to report into their own strong suspicion
(which was required for trial to proceed, whether by ordeal or, later, by
trial jury) without some confirmation from representatives of the lo
cale of the offense. The importance of the local community in the
administration of the criminal law thus pre-dated the trial jury, the
adoption of which ought to be understood as a continuation and en
hancement of traditional practices, not as a revolutionary step.6
How well was the bench positioned to see what lay behind a trial
jury conviction or acquittal, and to what extent did the jury dominate
the production of evidence? My own account of the way juries domi
nated trials in the Middle Ages probably overstates the matter. 7 There
must have been some, perhaps many, cases in which inculpatory evi
dence came forward during proceedings at the eyre. Local officials
were present, including the vill reeves, who subsequently served on
early trial juries. But their main duty was to report to hundred juries,
who were in turn questioned by the bench, and the hundredors were
in a position to relate who was suspected and then to confirm or to
cast doubt on the charges. It is difficult to see how central authorities
could have prevented local coloration of the facts presented either at
the presentment or at the trial stage-how, on their own motion, they
could have prevented either unjust conviction or false exoneration.
6. Green, Verdict According to Conscience, 4-13. Recent scholarship sug
gests that the pre- 1 220 origins of the criminal trial jury deserve greater emphasis than I
have given them. Susan Reynolds has demonstrated that group decision making had
long been the norm in England. Kingdoms and Communities in Western Europe, 9001300 (Oxford, 1984). The trial jury was a natural outgrowth of this fundamental aspect
of English political life, as was the jury of presentment itself. I have probably under
stated the significance of the evidence regarding the use of presentment in the century
preceding what I have referred to as the "Angevin transformation" of the criminal law.
Robert C. Palmer has suggested that the ordeal was employed largely to determine a
suspect's "present moral standing," not simply to ascertain whether specific charges re
garding past acts were true. The trial jury carried this tradition forward: nullification of
the strict letter of the law, Palmer argues, had relatively ancient roots. "Conscience and
the Law: The English Criminal Jury," Michigan Law Review 84 (Feb.-Apr. 1986): 79294.
7.

Green, Verdict According to Conscience, 16--20.
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From our perspective this may seem intolerable, but it bears remem
bering that representatives of the vills, whether they spoke for them
selves or through the hundredors, were rightly reckoned to be the best
informed. Moreover, they could usually be counted on to condemn
the worst offenders, the suspects who at the outset constituted most
of the persons who underwent trial by jury.8
We still know very little about the transition from the earliest use
of trial juries that Groot has explored to their later use in increasing
numbers of cases both at the eyre and more specifically at trials on
commissions of gaol delivery, oyer and terminer, and trailbaston.9 Of
these, gaol delivery was by far the most common, and significant, con
text for trials upon felony charges. I have emphasized the fact that
those tried at gaol delivery had earlier been presented, taken, and held
for trial (or bailed). 10 Many local officials attended the sessions of
which gaol delivery was a part, but there was nothing like the general
administrative process that characterized the eyre. Defendants were
brought forward and the charges against them were read; the oppor
tunity for testing these charges seems to have been meager, at least
before the late fourteenth century. As before, much must have de
pended upon the views of the most knowledgeable of those sum
moned as trial jurors. But who were these persons, and how were they
informed? And what does the sparse information we have on these
points suggest about the nature of the trial and the judge-jury relation
ship from the late thirteenth to the late fourteenth centuries?
The cumbersome two-part trial jury of the early eyres (hundredors
and members of the four vills) soon became a jury simply of twelve
from the hundred in which the offense was committed. In practice it
became more and more infrequent for those who served to have been
among the original presenters; 11 although they were not representa
tives of the neighboring vills in any formal sense, some probably did
come from the locale. What little we know about trial jury composi
tion suggests that the jury of the later eyres and at gaol delivery was
dominated by members of the village elites. These persons were typ
ically members of the hundred in which the offense had been com
mitted, but they were not necessarily its leading members. They con
stituted a kind of compromise produced by the interests of the
8.

See above, chap. 1 .

9 . Green, Verdict According t o Conscience, 20-21
cited therein.
10.

Ibid., 21-22.

11.

Ibid.

nn.

64--6 7 and sources
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authorities, who wanted upstanding yet informed jurors, and the in
terests of laymen, the most substantial of whom had, to be blunt, bet
ter things to do.
Bernard McLane's focus on the special trailbaston proceedings of
1328 allows a glimpse into community processes that research into
the gaol delivery records usually does not.12 The 1328 proceedings in
volved both an elaborate presentment stage and the trials of those pre
sented persons who volunteered themselves or were taken by force.
Because the sessions were ad hoc and were held to deal with what was
thought to be a crisis in public order, the presentments focused on
common malefactors, persons whose misdeeds were numerous and
notorious. McLane concludes that many offenses were thus strained
out-settled at the local level. If so, this sheds important light on the
latitude that presenters had. As to those charges that did go forward,
McLane's comment that presentment was itself a form of punish
ment is apt, for it helps to explain the high rate of acquittal by trial
juries. 13
By 1328 the separation between presenters (the later grand jury) and
trial jurors was well advanced but by no means completed. The former
were of decidedly higher status than the latter. The trial jurors, how
ever, included a sufficient number of members of the gentry or of pub
lic officials (approximately 25 percent) to allow the inference that
most trial jurors were at least substantial freemen; that is, they were
drawn from the groups that came to be called the yeomanry. John Post
confirms the fact that at late-fourteenth-century gaol deliveries most
jurors "came from a broad band in the middle classes of society." 1 4
More important, however, is the finding that trial jurors did not
often come from the "scene" of the offense, a finding echoed in Post's
and Edward Powell's essays. McLane locates those jurors he has been
able to trace as living anywhere from at the scene of the crime to ten or
more miles distant. A very large number lived from five to nine miles
away. But most juries included at least two persons who came from
the scene or from no more than three miles away, and most jurors
came from within the administrative unit and were, I would venture,
people with access to the local officials responsible for hearing com
plaints and taking preliminary steps toward the final stage of present
ment. I shall explore this last point presently. For the moment it is im12.

See above, chap. 2.

13. See above, chap. 2, text at n. 76. Edward Powell makes a related point in
chap. 4, text at nn. 75, 1 10.
14.

See above, chap. 3, text at n. 5.
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portant to remember that McLane is dealing with the unusual context
of trailbaston proceedings, at which presentment and trial were tan
dem events. His trial jurors can hardly have been in the dark about the
suspicions that grounded the presentments. The opportunities for
self-informing were probably at least as great for them as for the pre
senters. Moreover, for both presentment and trial the nature of the
proceedings put a premium on the role of notoriety- most defendants
were persons whom local communities wanted to bring under some
degree of embarrassment or actual punishment.
The nature of the proceedings also dictated the kinds of defendants
who were tried and the considerations that determined the trial ju
rors' verdicts. Defendants in felony cases probably fell mainly into
two classes: a few very serious offenders who stood a strong chance of
conviction and who were already under guard at the time of present
ment; and a far greater number of suspects who, upon presentment,
allowed themselves to be taken, believing that they would not be con
victed because they were innocent or because, although they were
guilty, the evidence against them was slight or the community viewed
them as persons who, all considered, did not deserve to be hanged.
Trailbaston proceedings thus generated a communal sorting-out proc
ess that began as soon as the order for the sessions was announced.
McLane's account of trial jury behavior bears significant relation to
the pretrial stages he has investigated. I shall suggest presently that at
most proceedings the category of persons acquitted literally for "lack
of evidence" against them was smaller than might be assumed. In the
case of trailbaston proceedings, it must indeed have been small if the
process that generated presentments took the form that McLane out
lines, as I believe it did. Even notorious felons and common malefac
tors were sometimes acquitted for a true lack of evidence in a specific
case, but more often they were acquitted, as McLane suggests, for
agreeing to appear and to put their lives on the country-and, I would
say, for thus implicitly reuniting themselves with the local commu
nity. Bishop Brinton (whom McLane quotes) took a less charitable
view; he stood at the head of a long line of observers who decried the
"wrongheaded" mercy of the criminal trial jury.15
Nor were the judges who presided at these and other fourteenth
century felony trials wrong in their own assessment that many guilty
persons were granted acquittals. They, too, heard the presentments
and must have assumed that those named represented a bad lot. So far
15. For McLane's quote from Bishop Brinton see above, chap. 2, text at n. 1 .
See also below, text a t nn. 5 1, 52; Green, Verdict According t o Conscience, 288-310.
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as we can tell, however, presentments were mainly conclusory state
ments regarding suspicions, not presentations of discrete bits of evi
dence that were tested before the bench. The "test" still resided in
trial jury verdicts in those cases for which defendants appeared. Al
though, given the nature of the proceedings, many of those who ap
peared must in fact have been guilty, some were either not guilty or
were not clearly proved to be, and over this determination, it seems to
me, the bench possessed relatively little leverage. Judicial doubts in
specific cases led, as McLane and Post have shown, to placing some
acquitted persons under guarantors, 16 but not to refusals to accept the
verdict of the community on the question of life or death. Whether the
judges thought they were most often faced with honest acquittals,
misconceived mercy, or outright corruption we cannot say.
If McLane examines an atypical setting, we must not assume that
more common settings conformed to a single type. Post's conclusion
that "no single or simple hypothesis" can be formulated regarding
"the functions of the criminal trial jury" is timely17-although I re
main convinced that real trends can nonetheless be identified. Post
himself finds a mainly hundredal jury, so the system that Powell con
cludes had largely broken down by the early fifteenth century remains
intact in Post's records of the preceding decades. Jurors did not often
come from the specific locale of the offense, however, and the process
of self-informing must have admitted of many and varied forms. In
some cases, Post conjectures, witnesses came forward to testify in
court. Although their presence, when it can be detected, as often as
not has to do with the "good fame" proceedings that precluded an ac
tual trial, 18 the era of witness testimony was already under way, with
eventual revolutionary implications for trial by jury. Post's exhuma
tion of late-fourteenth-century trial jurors suggests a transitional era,
but one in which the older traditions nevertheless affected most
cases. Jurors of the hundred, well positioned to know of defendants'
reputations and often of the weight that the local community placed
on specific charges, may well have dominated proceedings. The vari
ety of exceptions to this rule is well marked in Post's essay. I think an
extended discussion of Powell's essay will show, however, that the
tradition of the community-based determination of just deserts re
mained the rule even in the early fifteenth century.
Edward Powell's essay focusing on the early fifteenth century sug16.

See above, chap. 2, text at n. 79, and chap. 3, text at n. 53.

1 7.

See above, chap. 3, text at n. 57.

18.

See above, chap. 3, text at n. 47.
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gests the need for far-reaching reinterpretation of the nature of the late
medieval trial and of the role of the criminal trial jury.19 Powell's re
search also cautions against the view that there was an early-modem
transformation in the administration of the law; the situation in late
Tudor times, it is suggested, differed little from that of two centuries
before. The thrust of the argument is that by the early fifteenth cen
tury, juries were no longer mainly self-informing but instead heard
and assessed evidence set forth by private accusers and government
officials. By that date, if not before, the bench had the independent
source of evidence that I have argued made the Tudor bench more
powerful than its predecessors. There is some suggestion that the me
dieval trial had always possessed an active prosecution, even in the
early days, when the trial jury was also, in fact, self-informed. In such
a view, jurors originally had two main sources of evidence, and the
judge had a check on the jury; acquittals in homicide and theft and
verdicts of pardonable homicide were owing in many cases to a lack
of sufficient evidence against the defendant (especially in cases where
no accuser came forward) and in many others to merciful attitudes in
which the bench actively concurred.
Although the evidence for an active prosecution, either by private
prosecutor or by local officials, is still very sparse, Powell's specula
tions are plausible and could lead to a new view of the trial, at least as
it was in the early fifteenth century. We should note at the outset that
Powell is inclined to give substantial weight to the little evidence for
an independent prosecution that has thus far surfaced, on the grounds
that the early-fifteenth-century juries he has studied were no longer
mainly drawn from the locale in which the alleged offense had been
committed. This is an important finding, the significance of which
must be assessed with care. First, and most significantly, some juries
had no members from the relevant hundred, although on Powell's evi
dence this was the case for only 15 percent of the offenses. How were
the jurors informed in these cases? Did the trial reduce itself to an as
sessment of the credibility of the defendant, who was closely ques
tioned by the judge, and was this assessment influenced by the nature
of the charge? Was the trial likely to lead to an acquittal on grounds of
insufficient evidence? We do not know. But whatever we conclude re
garding this subset of cases, we are not driven to conclude that there
must typically have been an active and independent prosecution.
In most cases, county-wide juries carried at least a few members
1 9.

See above, chap. 4.

A Retrospective
369
from the relevant hundred.20 On some occasions there was only one,
a third of the time there were two, and in another third of the time
there were from three to six. Powell has shown that jurors were most
often well-established persons. Many were hundred officials, and
most of the others were persons who had ready access to such offi
cials. Although occasionally jurors were signed on at the assizes at the
last moment, typically they had some warning of their impending
duty. Two-thirds of the time, jurors went off to a delivery at which
only one or two persons from their hundred were due to stand trial;
the rest of the time there were three to five suspects under lock and
key. Many of these suspects had surrendered themselves to await the
delivery well knowing how the community viewed them. Here Pow
ell's data suggest a degree of preformed opinion about suspects to
which prospective jurors had easy access. None of this is to say that
those jurors who were from the defendant's hundred must necessarily
have come to court ready to inform their fellow jurors of the commu
nity's view (or views) regarding the appropriate resolution; it is
merely to say that they could easily have done so. All the more was
this true for the slightly earlier, more heavily local juries whose com
position Post has studied. Even if some members of most juries did
come to court armed with knowledge of the community's view of the
case and of the defendant's reputation generally, might the entire jury
nevertheless have received more evidence in court? Surely, as I have
suggested, the statements and demeanor of the defendant were very
significant, and sometimes the judge must have elicited an all-too
candid response or otherwise incriminating behavior. 21 Should one
suppose as well that a private accuser or local official typically testi
fied against the defendant?
For the early period, some evidence takes a form that we would not
expect it to take if formal testimony in court against the accused was
common. 22 Thereafter, as stated, there is occasional evidence of a pri20.

See above, Figure 4.2.

21.

Green, Verdict According to Conscience, 67.

22. Bracton on the Laws and Customs of England, ed. S. E. Thome ( Cam
bridge, Mass., 1968), 2:404-6. Post correctly observes that justices interrogated "de
fendants and their accusers to elicit claims and statements well outside the formal
needs of appeal and exception" (citing Placita Carone, ed. J. M. Kaye, Selden Society
Supplementary Series, 4 [ 1 966], 8-9, 15-22). See above, chap. 3, text at n. 40. It is im
portant to emphasize that the instances in which this occurred were cases brought on
appeal, not on indictment. In the latter cases, the bench interrogated the defendant be
fore seeking the verdict of a jury, but no principal accuser or witnesses are mentioned.
No doubt the procedure used in appeals (a small minority of cases) was a significant
source of the procedure that eventually emerged in trials upon indictment (the great
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vate accuser, but not much more. Altogether, there is too little yet for
us to say very much. But, admittedly, this is mainly due to the state
of the extant record. It is perhaps unsound to conclude in either direc
tion. Rather, let us accept, for the sake of argument, the possibility of
in-court prosecution testimony in the later Middle Ages and hypoth
esize about its nature and its likely effects. Our central question is, of
course, how far does the presence of in-court testimony require a re
vision of the view that the medieval criminal trial jury typically ex
ercised very substantial power over the resolution of cases?
It is important to keep in mind that the opportunity for self-inform
ing was always present in the Middle Ages. We are not discussing a
mythical beast. Powell himself asserts that as late as the early fif
teenth century some jurors in some cases were still self-informed.
The question he seems to be asking is whether they were still (or ever
had been) solely self-informed. The evidence set forth by Groot,
Mclane, and Post is not, I suppose, inconsistent with the possibility
of in-court prosecution testimony alongside self-informing, but that
evidence-and the evidence adduced by Powell as well-does make it
appear that self-informing was at the very least one inevitable and sig
nificant aspect of the medieval trial. In many instances, trial jurors
simply could not have avoided knowing something about the com
munity's view of events, parties, and appropriate results, and even of
the credibility of specific claims. Many trial jurors in the early period
had served as presenters in the same case; moreover, throughout the
entire period jurors who were leading community figures (including
officials) were bound to know a good deal about offenders held for
trial. There was no requirement that jurors banish such things from
their minds-quite the opposite. Jury self-informing was a lawful fact
of legal life.
How ought one to think about testimony for the prosecution in the
later Middle Ages alongside self-informing? To begin with, it is not
yet certain that local officials were called upon to testify in court, be
yond stating what formal charges had been laid against the accused.
With the exception of some coroners' rolls, their rolls and memoranda
rarely record the results of investigations, over and above the formal
charges made before them, charges that were the basis for present
ments and that remained a check on the level and kind of offense for
which a defendant had been held for trial. This is not to say that such
local officials ( constables, hundred-bailiffs, coroners) did not possess
majority of cases). But there are few, if any, signs that this latter development had taken
place as of the time of Placita Carone !the mid to late thirteenth century).
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useful information. By the time of the trial they probably knew a fair
amount. But what they knew may have been, for example, the fact
that the accusing parties were still furious or, conversely, that they
were prepared to make a settlement; it may have been mainly a mat
ter of the suspect's reputation generally and of the community's view
about the "appropriate" resolution of a trial for life or death. It is my
guess that if local officials testified, it was this kind of knowledge that
structured their testimony. If they served as jurors, they gave their
verdicts on a similar basis. Powell has suggested that one reason for
the high acquittal rate even as late as the fifteenth century was the
large number of cases in which there was insufficient evidence.23 No
doubt that is true. But it might well be the case that much of the time
the conclusion "insufficient evidence" was a result of communal
processes and not, as it were, an objective fact. If local officials did tes
tify, what they said they "knew"-how certain they said they were
about the truth of charges-was a reflection of the kind of filtering
process that would be hidden from the bench and that I have attrib
uted to verdicts rendered by jurors.24 If such officials did testify, that
is, they probably behaved largely as they did when they served-and
Post and Powell show they did serve-as jurors.
We should not, however, overlook the possibility that local officials
sometimes spoke with candor in court, even in cases where that can
dor required setting forth testimony that threatened the outcome that
the local community had, through informal processes, agreed upon.
Especially from the late fourteenth century on, increasing investiga
torial activities by justices of the peace and their inferior officers prob
ably created a relatively non-local source of pressure that placed the
local official, in the courtroom, in a bind between his duties to the
Crown and his role in the community.25 Ultimately, it may have been
23.

See above, chap. 4, text at nn. 1 1 8-19.

24.

Green, Verdict According to Conscience, chap. 2.

25. The tension I am referring to is, of course, not merely a function of the
pressure brought to bear by a "relatively non-local" justice of the peace upon "rela
tively local" village officials. Within most local areas there probably were significant
differences of opinion between social groups--and even within such groups--regarding
the resolution of disputes involving criminal offenses. It is important to recognize,
however, that I am not denying that local communities were frequently divided on all
sorts of questions, that for many purposes there was simply no "community" in the
sense of a unified, or even general, community of opinion. What I am suggesting is that
there was relatively widespread consensus regarding the question of life or death, that
at the least there were some cases so serious (or offenders so nasty or untrustworthy)
that death was generally deemed to be deserved and others so trivial (though capital un
der the law) that death was generally deemed unwarranted. In some cases, perhaps
many, there were conflicting views. In some of these cases, the conflicts were worked
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a recognition of the pressures of localism that led the Crown to place
so much emphasis upon early intervention by the justices of the peace
and upon the recording of statements from all the parties concerned.
This practice, combined with the real decline of the local, self-in
formed jury (whenever it ultimately came about), constituted the
transformation of early-modem criminal administration. Its source,
but not its mature manifestation, is plainly visible by the early fif
teenth century.
Even in Smith's day ( 1 560s) the vitality of the system of prosecution
seems to have depended upon in-court testimony of the accuser
victim and his supporting witnesses, not of officials-at least, so far as
one can tell from either Sir Thomas's perhaps muddled account or
from later depictions of felony trials.26 What made the system so rel
atively powerful by Smith's day was the writing down of both the
charges and the evidence (circumstances, reasons for beliefs, and
other evidence), immediately after the commission of an offense, and
the accused's story, probably given as soon as he was taken and before
he had heard his accuser's account. This is the kind of information
that allowed the Tudor bench a substantial advantage vis-a-vis what
was by then clearly a non-local, non-self-informed jury.27
Assuming that by the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries
accusers did often testify in court, their testimony may have consti
tuted a relatively weak form of the prosecution that was common by
late Tudor times. The accused's sang-froid in denying complicity,
when it was in fact a dishonest denial, must have been much greater
when he or she faced a local jury (or even a jury upon which only one
or two local persons of substance sat) and knew that the local com
munity took a relatively benign view of the case. (This last point-the
defendant's knowledge of the community's view-is significant and
not unfairly posited, for it is, quite reasonably, one of Powell's as
sumptions concerning the reasons why many defendants made themout before trial, but in others they were not. I am conjecturing that pressure from
"above" and outside the local community (in the form of the activities of justices of the
peace) may sometimes have induced local officials to behave as though there were no
consensus in the defendant's favor when in fact there was and, a fortiori, not to lean in
the defendant's favor when there was no such consensus. I have consistently retreated
to general tendencies, even though in particular cases the specific facts were of great
importance, because I have sought to identify those trends that were sufficiently strong
that they had an impact on, for example, typical jury behavior, dominant judicial per
ceptions of that behavior, and the "community's" general understanding of what it was
appropriate for jurors to do.
26. T. Smith, De Republica Anglorum, ed. M. Dewar (Cambridge, 1 982),
1 10-16; Old Bailey Sessions Papers, passim.
27.
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selves available for trial at gaol delivery. )28 And even an accusation
that carried some force and was parried by only the weakest kind of
denial was still a matter for the jury to resolve. So long as even a subset
of the jury was composed of substantial local people on oath to sort
out the weak accusations from the strong, the well-meant but "mis
taken" ones from the convincing ones ( "insufficient evidence" again),
there was, more than just in theory, a body of "evidence" on credibil
ity and the like dominated by jurors. Their manipulation of that evi
dence to exonerate those who were guilty but who ought not (in their
view) to be hanged, could remain hidden from the bench. These were
facts of life that were themselves instrumental in determining when
victims would appeal, or appear to prosecute upon a presentment or
indictment. I believe Powell would agree that one corollary of a rela
tively high conviction rate in appeals was a relatively low appearance
rate by victims in the kinds of offenses for which the community
rarely hanged offenders. 29
The result of all this may well have been relatively little candid and
forceful prosecution testimony in that great range of offenses for
which society was typically reluctant to have recourse to the gallows,
even in the later Middle Ages. And I would posit that in many cases
there was therefore a continuation of older traditions of hidden, jury
based manipulation or suppression of evidence. This is not to deny,
however, that as the bench's views came to accord with those of the
community-or were seen to-more and more candid testimony may
have come forward, whether from the prosecution, the defendant, or
the jurors. Especially in homicide, jury-based rejection of those coro
ner's inquisition details that inculpated a defendant but did not estab
lish a case for which the community would have him or her hanged
was no longer critical. An "understanding" bench did not have to be
kept in the dark. Powell's suggestion that by the early fifteenth cen
tury the judge and jury openly agreed on mercy seems plausible.30 If
Powell's surmise is correct that by the early fifteenth century there
was more of a real prosecution, it may be that these developments
were interrelated. That is, we might expect to find both an increase in
prosecution by victim-accusers in the most serious cases, where the
community was ready to apply the law to the fullest, and greater can
dor on the part of local officials and others (as jurors) in the least seri
ous ones, where even the bench considered hanging inappropriate.
28.

See above, chap. 4, text at n. 115.

29.

See above, chap. 4, text at nn. 76, 77.

30.

See above, chap. 4, text at n. 123.
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But all this remains a matter of conjecture. On the main point that
Powell has raised, one must concede the possibility of a different kind
of trial in a substantial number of cases by at least the later Middle
Ages from the one I posited in my book as nearly universal virtually
until Tudor times.31 One must grant, too, that the "transformation"
of the trial began earlier and moved more glacially than I suggested.
Indeed, having earlier put my case in the strongest terms, I should
now restate it in the weakest form, giving the new evidence both
proper respect and room for growth and according the unknowable the
caution that is its due.
Throughout much of the medieval period, we ought to conclude, the
jury was at least in large part self-informing, and it frequently domi
nated the gathering and setting forth of evidence, especially in simple
homicide and nonaggravated theft. There was a sufficiently large
body of such cases for a tradition of nullification of the law by juries
to develop, one that the bench recognized but was typically unable to
prevent in specific cases. Over time the distance between judge and
jury lessened with regard to the treatment of such cases, if, indeed,
there ever had been real disagreement rather than a community-based
fear of disagreement that conditioned the jurors' manipulation of the
facts, lack of candor, or reliance upon "insufficiency of evidence." Ju
dicial concurrence in such cases was to some extent the result of legal
change that took account of jury behavior, but it also reflected the
bench's realization that the jury acted with severity in many of the
most serious cases. Nonetheless, it was the authorities' attempts to
ensure even more convictions in the latter that led to the increased
activity of royal officials and the greater frequency of the submission
of a real case for the prosecution. This, in tum, allowed for more care
ful monitoring of jury verdicts, in the less as well as in the more seri
ous cases. Combined as it was with the ascent of a county-based jury
that included virtually no truly local and self-informed persons, the
greatly enhanced prosecution augured a new age in the history of the
criminal trial. Ultimately, more pliant jurors and the use of Star
Chamber also contributed crucially to the power of the Tudor
bench.32 But it is also true that this transformation (if I may still em
ploy that word) owed something significant to changes in the six
teenth century in substantive law that lessened the distance between
official and popular attitudes regarding the use of capital punishment.
The truth of the matter, of course, probably lies somewhere be31.

Green, Verdict According to Conscience, 26-27.

32.

Ibid., 140-43.
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tween the two positions I have delineated. Over the long term, judi
cial control of proceedings probably increased faster than I have sug
gested but not so dramatically as to preclude an early period of
relatively strong domination by the jury. Trials were probably more
complicated affairs than I have suggested. As Post concludes, at least
implicitly, sometimes the bench monitored and steered the outcome,
sometimes it was overwhelmed. The working out of a judge-jury
agreement, especially in homicide, may well have taken place in the
context of trials that presented only a partially "hidden" defense. The
bench may have acceded to a merciful view of the matter even though
if it had pressed, it could have established the "truth" and determined
the outcome mainly on its own terms. Trials were not only more complex from the point of view of the presentation of evidence and the op
tions exercised by the bench; they were probably also more complex
psychologically or, as it were, socially. All sorts of factors determined
how each side would behave, and in this setting, as these studies on
the composition of medieval criminal trial juries suggest, there pre
vailed an even more flexible understanding of the law-and of the ap
propriate application of legal standards-than the one depicted in my
earlier work.

When James Cockburn termed my book "one of the most uninhibited
works" of recent legal history, he may have meant uninhibited by
lack of hard evidence.33 Cockburn and I have long differed in our views
concerning the subject about which he knows most and I know least:
judge-jury relations at criminal assizes between 1560 and 1660. In a
lengthy footnote I cautiously suggested that Cockburn had overstated
the degree to which the extant evidence suggests that judges con
trolled juries at assizes, particularly between 1570 and 1625.34 More
significantly, I attempted to shift the terms of the debate by suggest
ing that the exercise of judicial authority was itself contingent upon
some substantial degree of judicial acquiescence in the "standards"
that had long been applied by the community, or at least that part of
it represented by the trial jury.35 Of course, Cockburn and I agree that
the bench was very powerful during this period. For the reasons stated
above, I do believe that in the late Tudor period the constraints upon
the jury were more powerful than at most other times and that the
33.

Ibid., dust jacket.

34.

Ibid., 1 50-52 n. 1 79.

35.

Ibid., chap. 4, sec. 2.
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second half of the sixteenth century marks a culmination in the
growth of the authority of the bench, as that authority was exercised
in criminal trials at assizes. The issue between us has been, as is often
the case, a matter of degree-but a matter of degree that matters.
Cockburn has now both strengthened the argument for the relative
passivity of juries in the period 1560-1590 and conceded an increase
in jury initiative thereafter. He has also made an important contribu
tion to the history of the criminal law through his demonstration that
jury composition, and probably judge-jury relations, underwent cru
cial changes in the middle of the seventeenth century.36 I believe that
there is much to the view afforded by the essays in this volume that
the maturation of the judge-controlled trial was gradual, spanning the
years from 1350 to 1550; that it reached a higher peak than I had hith
erto supposed, perhaps in the very late sixteenth century; and that a
modern era of greater sharing of power between judge and jury
emerged fairly suddenly-rather than simply evolving out of a simi
larly textured past-in the several decades preceding the Restoration.
Nevertheless, much as there is to this view, and in the face perhaps of
other "jurors" who may be called upon to resolve this question, I
should like to hold out a bit longer before reaching a final verdict. I am
not fully convinced that jury passivity was ever anything like abso
lute. I am still inclined to the view that the "community" constituted
a significant constraint upon judicial authority with respect to the
administration of the criminal law even during the half century
(roughly 1550 to 1600) still in dispute.
In part Cockburn and I view the late Tudor period with differing per
spectives on what counts as the exercise of authority, and in part we
are asking different questions. Where the bench prevented jury control
of the outcome through a form of overruling of the verdict, Cockburn
rightly sees judicial power and jury ineffectuality. But I see jury proc
ess as less than fully controlled and wonder whether the lesson
learned is that the jury must not disagree with the bench, or that jury
disagreement, although "allowed," may sometimes be subsequently
frustrated by the bench. Where Cockburn rightly sees judicial avoid
ance of the use of the jury, I infer a living awareness, and fear, of po
tential jury independence. Where Cockburn rightly sees judicial steer
ing of jury resolutions that do not strictly accord with the letter of the
law, I wonder whether one result might have been the jurors' self-in
terested assumption that they shared the power of discretion.37 In36.

See above, chap. 6.

37.
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deed, I suspect that the bench fostered that very assumption, so far as
it believed that doing so would enhance the administration of the law
without undermining ultimate judicial control. I do not know how
often the bench lost its bet on this risky device, but I doubt that it al
ways won it.
We are only now coming to understand the nature of jury composi
tion in the middle period, especially in the late sixteenth and early
seventeenth centuries. Peter Lawson's work, which roughly comple
ments the assumptions about jury composition of some other schol
ars, notably Cynthia Herrup, suggests that the later-Elizabethan and
Jacobean trial juries drew heavily upon the yeomanry at the assizes
and (here there is general agreement with Stephen Roberts) upon
lesser yeomen and even husbandmen at quarter sessions.38 Lawson
rightly emphasizes that, in the main, jurors were drawn from the
elites of England's villages. These were men who, in national terms,
may be described as of the middling sort, but they stood closer to the
top of society than that term suggests (certainly closer than I earlier
suggested). 39 As Lawson admits, the evidence he has been able to mus
ter with respect to the wealth of jurors is sparse, and our conclusions
on the recruitment of jurors from the upper reaches of the yeoman
class must remain tentative. Jurors were propertied, but they were not
all farmers; men of small commerce-artisans and tradesmen-were
among their ranks. From a local perspective they were, of course, of
high status. Although they were not county leaders, they were none
theless leaders of village society, persons upon whom much of English
governance had devolved. Beholden in a sense to the sheriff, the jus
tices of the peace, and others who exercised the power of selection,
these men were, I would suggest, beholden also to the hundreds in
which they dwelled and which they helped to govern.
Keith Wrightson has shown how this order both governed the base
of the population and mediated between it and higher orders.40 They
had to live among those whose disputes they helped to resolve, and
the resolution through jury verdicts at assizes was only one of many
forms of intercession they were called upon to practice. It would be
38. See above, chap. 5; Cynthia B. Herrup, The Common Peace: Participa
tion and the Criminal Law in Seventeenth-Century England I Cambridge, 1 987), chap.
6. On Roberts, see above, chap. 7.
39.
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incautious to view this order as being able with impunity to impose
standards for which communal support was lacking upon the local
community-or, if in some sense able to do so, as being so inclined.
Lawson rightly calls attention to the instrumental role the yeomanry
played in many aspects of local governance,41 a role that-I would
conjecture-conditioned them to understand and acquiesce in the
standards of the respectable poor, who were frequently the victims of
theft or physical assault.
It was this yeoman class that inherited the duties of the local con
stables and hundred elites whom Powell found serving on early-fif
teenth-century juries. Their circumstances differed, however, from
those of their medieval ancestors. As central authority reached down
more pervasively into local life, the village elites came under greater
pressure from above. Over the course of the seventeenth century, the
gulf between rich and poor widened,42 local elites identified more
commonly with the county leadership, and the central authorities
sought to rest governance, including assize jury duty, upon the more
substantial of these yeomen, even upon some from among the gentry
itself. Our glimpse into this world through Lawson's and Cockburn's
research suggests that the resettlement of jury duty had begun to take
place in the decades before the Puritan Revolution; the sharp increase
in serial service and the regularization of the "office" of foreman al
low us to identify a kind of watershed in the years around 1 650.43
Throughout this period the yeomanry remained dominant, and even
its lesser figures occasionally played a prominent role. At the same
time, however, authorities were severely limiting the number of per
sons who would be called to serve, thereby making it possible to se
cure jurors of higher status and greater experience-and perhaps ones
who better understood, and more readily accepted, the judicial per
spective.
Cockburn and Lawson nonetheless see the world of pre-Revolution
criminal administration differently. For Cockburn, lesser men-es
pecially less experienced men-meant greater judicial control, and a
less regularized system of jury service meant far more frequent re
course to the tales.44 Lawson depicts Elizabethan and Jacobean Hert
fordshire jurors as accustomed to governance in their locales, even if
they were less experienced as assize jurors than their later counter41.
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parts. He finds little evidence of the use or the tales.45 Moreover, Law
son emphasizes the independence jurors retained in this period, al
though he would agree that their natural inclinations led jurors to be
severe where the bench, too, would have been so. Cockburn, Lawson,
and I are all in agreement on this last point, and I would stress the im
portance of the fact that much of society-even England's husband
men and laborers-was prepared to have done with truly nasty of
fenders. It was this community of agreement on the most serious
cases that had from earliest times, I argued in my book, made reliance
upon local elites-a middling class in national terms-both possible
and desirable. 46
It remains unclear just how far assize judges bothered to steer jurors
in cases on which general social agreement was less firm. Cockburn's
case is persuasive to a point, but the pattern of verdicts suggests a de
gree of jury-based resolution, which is a body of evidence that Lawson
emphasizes.47 It remains my view that judges were aware of and as
similated these standards, so that even when they led juries they were
often moving toward goals jurors saw as their own, and that the proc
ess of steering was thereby partly invisible to jurors and the observing
public. That "public," moreover, must be viewed as wider than that
in attendance at assizes; it included as well persons from the local
communities to which those offenders who were not singled out for
the most severe-and exemplary-punishment returned.48 We shall
probably never know for certain whether their neighbors attributed
their narrow escape to judge or jury, or both. But I am inclined to think
that some semblance prevailed of a tradition (that is, a community
based impression) of the jury's right to share in the power of mitiga
tion.
Finally, Lawson's point that we ought not to make too much of the
concept of mercy is important.49 Juries could, in the first place, exer
cise great severity. And often where they acquitted or rendered partial
verdicts they were responding to the degree of seriousness of an of
fense in a matter-of-fact way. Whether they had a subjective sense of
acting out of mercy is more difficult to say. Lawson gives weight to
the high standard of proof required by both the bench and the jurors
(at least in cases where rank prejudice did not intervene), although he
45.

See above, chap. 5, text at n. 43.
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pays greater attention to the influence upon bench and jurors of the
character of the offender and the nature of the offense. so These were
not, of course, entirely separate phenomena: where the offense was
capital but of a less serious variety (or where the offender was a recid
ivist) the standard was higher, and vice versa. Whether jurors thought
in terms of the offense, as such, rather than self-deludingly in terms of
a constant standard of proof, we cannot say. I shall return to this im
portant point.
The selection process that Lawson describes-and that links his
work to much of the scholarship on the late-seventeenth- and eight:
eenth-century criminal trial jury-may well have appeared differently
to different observers. Some eighteenth-century legal writers char
acterized jurors as too merciful;s1 so, too, did Lambard in the period
with which Lawson is concerned.s2 Moreover, the view from below
may have been more complicated than the several essays on the early
modern period in this volume suggest. Accusers and defendants, as
well as the laboring poor of the local communities from which these
participants came, no doubt internalized the message of the gallows
ritual. Property was, after all, sacrosanct. But they also formed some
understanding of the process by which defendants were spared: lives,
too, held value, and the ritual of correction might involve forgiveness
and reacceptance into the community of the living. From one perspec
tive, as Lawson suggests, the law might not have been modified by ju
rors, whose independence expressed itself in the application of rules
as they were meant to be applied.s3 Indeed, that is the view I have
taken. s4 But this seems to me to redefine the law in a way that allowed
it to be understood as a law of mercy.
One particular feature of Cockburn's perspective on the Elizabe
than and early Jacobean period that I do not entirely share is its im
plicit message of the triumph of central authorities over the forces of
localism. My use of the word community with reference to the jury
and the people and interests it represented has been too casual. In my
conclusion I belatedly pointed out that jury independence relative to
the central authorities may sometimes have reflected jury depend
ence upon local ones.ss This is a point that Stephen Roberts, writing
50.
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about the Interregnum, makes with some force.56 His focus is on
quarter sessions, which were decidedly more local proceedings than
those held before a predominantly royal bench. It remains to be seen
whether gentry influence over quarter sessions jurors (to the extent
that Roberts has been able to establish that influence) implies that
there was a similar lack of jury independence at the assizes. For the
moment, we might doubt that the local gentry surrendered the deter
mination of life-or-death issues to royal judges. Why should we not
suppose that the corollary of some manipulation by hundred or county
potentates at quarter sessions was jury manipulation by the same lo
cal powers at the assizes? Cockburn's depiction of the assizes-the
ritual and accoutrements of the presence of royal surrogates-is pow
erful, and his argument must be read in light of the theater that the
assizes represented.57 It was a moment of intrusion into county affairs
that saw county gentry look to the source of power and preferment
that was the Crown. But court and country relations were reciprocal.
Royal policy always countenanced a sharing of power and discretion
with county gentry and yeomanry, so long as it was implemented in
appropriate fashion and did not function, as central authorities saw it,
as a disparagement of royal authority. 58
The jury, then, even in decline, was an extension of both central and
local interests. Its power, particularly its recourse to discretion, some
times reflected the limits of royal influence on local politics. I do not
mean to suggest that the jury often overtly signaled a tension between
central and local power; I do believe, however, that the relationship
between central authorities and local interests naturally implied
some limits upon judicial manipulation of the criminal assize jury. I
suspect that the reorganization of the jury in the mid seventeenth cen
tury that Cockburn has convincingly depicted reflected a new era in
central coordination of local matters. It both recognized the relatively
mild degree of royal control (or the high costs of manifesting control)
that had characterized the preceding era of court-country relations
and prefigured later central dominance through more sophisticated
forms of the cooptation of local elites, forms that, ironically, as I shall
later suggest, maintained and even increased the local sharing of
power with the central authorities.
Roberts's work on Devonshire reminds us of the diversity of local
56.
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conditions in seventeenth-century England and of the element of
group (or class) interest that informed peacekeeping in the domains of
England's local but "godly" magistrates.59 Not surprisingly, Roberts
finds the world of Leveller jury theory a far cry from the reality of
everyday practice.60 At the same time, his study of practices in Devon
helps to put the radical jury rhetoric into perspective, because one
glimpses therein the source of the frustration felt by those who ideal
ized the legal practices of the original "free" Anglo-Saxon commu
nity.
Here one must recognize that the Levellers and some other contem
poraries overstated the power of the central authorities. They por
trayed those authorities as able to exert themselves almost without
limits in the provinces. In this way the local gentry, even when acting
on its own interests, was deemed to be in active collusion with royal
officials and to be an enemy of the lesser propertied yeomanry and
husbandmen whose autonomy had vanished, so the theory ran, with
the Conquest.61 Lilburne's was a view from the center, where the
most important local figures sat in the Parliament that, in alliance
with Cromwell, sought to stamp out political dissension in the coun
ties and to maintain a tight grip on political representation and social
and economic preferment. Digger opposition to the jury, an opposi
tion that I have perhaps underestimated, 62 reflected a more accurate
understanding of the interests that controlled provincial civil and
criminal trial proceedings.
The Diggers, too, opposed the central government, but they had no
illusions about the prospects for local democracy. Roberts's focus on
the problem of nonconformity further exposes the absence of total
overlap between central and local perspectives and the relatively free
hand of local potentates on their own turf.63 Such cases may have been
particularly attractive-and misleading-to Leveller leaders, whose
unyielding opposition to the central authorities may once again have
diverted their attention from the undemocratic local conditions that
paradoxically guaranteed effective resistance by the provinces. But
the main point, as I have suggested, is that no matter how great the
59.
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distance between Leveller law-finding theory and daily community
based practice, Leveller views-precisely because those views were
expressed in the rhetoric of local democratic self-government-could
nonetheless have great force within a certain restricted comer of the
revolution. 64
The inferences for assize jury independence that I have drawn from
Roberts's evidence make more understandable the collision between
such royal justices as Hyde, Twysden, and Kelyng and gentry-con
trolled grand and trial jurors, both in nonconformity cases and in rou
tine felonies.65 In the early 1 660s at least, royal judges occasionally
vied with local men of power, and I see no reason to suppose that this
was a novel or exceptional event (although the lengths to which the
Restoration bench went in order to resolve the tension probably were
novel). The episode perhaps highlighted the need for greater central
control over local juries and the limits that continued to present
themselves to central authorities even into the era of the reform of
jury selection and service. I have stressed Vaughan's detachment in
Bushel's Case, a case that arose from Quaker preaching and that was
at least in part colored by the exhortations of Penn and others to ju
rors. According to these exhortations, jurors were to "find the law," a
theory that Vaughan clearly opposed but seemed not to want to con
front openly.66 A second form of detachment appears to characterize
Vaughan's language-if, that is, one reads jury resolutions against the
background of local interests and control. Vaughan would have us be
lieve that the issue was, at base, freedom of conscience, presumably
freedom from all "foreign" influences, local or central. We should not
be surprised, however, to discover that all parties found such "free
dom" a convenient rationalization for the self-interested resolutions
that they sought to protect from other, alien interests. In the face of
royal authorities, local men appealed not to their own interests but to
principles of justice. Those principles soon took on some semblance
of a life of their own.
The history of the jury in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,
then, is the history of a struggle for control of an institution that stood
in the front lines of many kinds of political struggle. Rhetorical dec
lamations passed easily from one context to another; as I have sug
gested, some opponents of the later Stuarts employed the rhetoric of
64.
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Lilburne, although they felt little kinship with leveling ideas.67 Per
haps that rhetoric also drew upon the claims made by selfish local
men who put their right to determine local cases of life and death in
the most high-minded terms. Whatever the role of central-local ten
sions in the episode that brought embarrassment to Kelyng, the par
liamentary censure of that royal judge came to be understood in terms
of a true right of non-coercion.68 These essays, and similar work re
cently completed or in progress, have begun to establish the distance
between rhetoric and reality in seventeenth-century politics and legal
practice.69 Moreover, this body of scholarship also holds the potential
for exposing the relationship-that is, the exchange-between rheto
ric and reality, and thus for allowing us to produce an informed his
tory of contemporary ideas about the jury, particularly about the in
fluence of those ideas on ongoing practices at all levels.

The three essays on the jury from the Restoration to the late eight
eenth century situate the members of the assize criminal trial jury
among the upper orders of English society. I have pointed to the emer
gence by the seventeenth century of a gulf between the few relatively
wealthy and the many poor or downright destitute Englishmen. In
this context it will hardly do to speak of jurors simply as middling
men, for those groups were nonetheless among the more exalted of
English society. Moreover, as these three essays conclusively demon
strate, the authorities strove persistently and successfully to ensure
that jurors came from that class of persons who were the cities' and
the countryside's natural, though local, governors, men who in al
most all aspects of political, social, and economic life dominated the
everyday affairs of most of society. Not only were jurors experienced
in the affairs of local government and drawn from groups that were
used to working together, but they also came from elements that, in
many matters, looked for leadership from, and alliance with, Eng
land's most exalted rulers. How much a part of, or bound to, this high
est order were they? As jurors, to what extent did they, for all their rel
atively high status, nonetheless reflect the interests and attitudes of
the numerically greater part of society? What can one say about the
67.
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class aspect of the administration of the criminal law? Our essays, and
work related to them, have begun to answer these questions, but we
have not yet achieved a fully unified view.7°
At least two fairly distinct emphases now characterize scholarship
on the political and social role of the criminal trial jury. Peter King
identifies the assize trial jurors as men of the middling sort, members
of a class or group of classes that stood in the top third of English so
ciety but, he significantly emphasizes, below and apart from the gen
try in wealth, office, outlook, and manners.71 King views the middling
order as having its own interests. Nevertheless, to some extent he sees
its members as reflecting attitudes shared by those below as well as
above them, depending upon the issue at hand. Douglas Hay, in the
essay published here (more distinctly perhaps than in his earlier
work), situates the jurors about where King does in terms of wealth
and background, but portrays them as more prosecution-oriented, as
less prone to empathize with those below them who were tried at the
assizes. 72 Beattie's detailed essay on the trial jurors of late-seven
teenth-century London demonstrates that the economic status of
these jurors was substantially higher than that of persons who served
on the provincial (Surrey and Sussex) juries he studied earlier.73 He
characterizes the status of provincial jurors in terms that accord with
King's evidence, but he emphasizes the broad agreement between
judge and jury. It appears to be his view that the justice meted out at
provincial assizes reflected the attitudes of at least the top third of so
ciety. Beattie draws no conclusions about the justice meted out at
London trials, but his characterization of London trial jurors suggests
that it reflected the views of persons immediately below the small
aristocratic elite. 74 Although in Beattie's view London emerges as an
exception, it is an exception of great importance, both because of Lon
don's influence on the development of English criminal administra70. For a review of the literature on the eighteenth century generally, see
Joanna Innes and John Styles, "The Crime Wave: Recent Writing on Crime and Crimi
nal Justice in Eighteenth-Century England," fournal of British Studies 25 ( 1 986): 380435.
71.
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tion and because of the place London trials held in the minds of con
temporaries, that is, in what was coming to be the prevailing idea of
the jury in trials for felony. In the end, each of these views about the
jury possesses its own kind of truth.
I previously maintained that the jury functioned throughout its
long history to effect an accommodation between ruling authorities
and a substantial part of English society.75 In this sense, I suggested,
the jury was both an elitist and a democratizing institution, although
I also cautioned that too much ought not to be made of the latter no
tion: one man's democratizing institution is another's coopted exten
sion of aristocratic rule. Here Hay and I have disagreed, at least in em
phasis, and in my view his present essay strengthens his position
considerably. Quite obviously, juries did not represent the entire pop
ulation; in some times and places, and with regard to some kinds of
offenses, they represented a relatively small part of society. We are
perhaps reduced to deciding how often jurors had to represent (in
terms of their perspective, not their status) how many people and in
what kinds of cases in order to be of the larger community, as opposed
to being above it. Do we not also need to know the subjective state of
jurors as they went about their work? Surely we do, but is even that
knowledge sufficient?
Here I would resist an affirmative answer, and my reasons for re
sisting may help explain my own preference for what I (and I alone)
have termed the communitarian view. It will not do to define the jury
solely in terms of the class ties of its members, or of their politics in
the simple sense of their conscious identification with, or rejection of,
authority. We need to know the constraints within which juries acted,
even when they were not cognizant of those constraints, and we need
to know the psychology that jurors typically possessed when reaching
determinations of life or death, even when they were unaware of those
feelings. There were instances of people and offenses-the two were
not always related, as King's work makes clear76-for which the deci
sion to end a life was easy; there were others for which it was unthink
able; and there were still other instances, perhaps very many, in
which, whether one took a life or spared a life, some translation into
a special language of justification was necessary. Herein lay the poten
tially competing claims of just retribution and mercy; the latter claim
was sometimes (but only sometimes) so broadly defined as to be
equivalent to a claim of simple humanity. Our study of that language
75.
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of humanity is primitive, and its inaccessibility to us may lead us to
underestimate its pervasiveness and importance.
It is equally possible, however, to overstate the role of mercy, which
was, in any case, only one of several significant and conflicting as
pects of the administration of the criminal law. We must assess that
role in the context of a harsh penal law that claimed the lives of many
Englishmen whose crimes were produced by the rigors and injustices
of economic life. The mitigation practiced at eighteenth-century as
sizes was itself often mitigated: the principal alternative sanction to
execution was transportation for seven or fourteen years or for life. 77
Indeed, from one perspective the capital sanction was instrumental
not only because it induced terror but also because it allowed higher
orders to conceive of themselves as merciful even as they sent thou
sands into long and often cruel exile. Moreover, as had always been
the case, it was the widespread agreement that the nastiest offenders
ought to suffer the extreme rigors of the law that made even the mod
est form of mitigation that was commonly practiced an acceptable
feature of the law.
Whatever the actual degree of mitigation, and whatever were the
conditions that made it common, the manner in which the various or
ders of English society viewed the abundant recourse to it remains a
complex matter. The juror class, for its part, was a law-enforcing class
that spent much of its time and energy arranging for its own physical
security. But at the moment of trial, and especially at the moment of
judgment-that is, of rendering verdict-its perspective may often
have been shaped by other inclinations and concerns as well. The
courtroom was not a meeting room for an association for the preven
tion of crime. Its doors may have been open to people and attitudes
whose presence caused jurors to see themselves and their role in a
more broadly representative fashion. In many cases the moment of
verdict may well have been a moment in which, in an important
sense, Englishmen acted against their "better" judgment.
In his essay on London jurors, as in his previous work, Beattie seeks
the roots of the fundamental changes in the administration of the
criminal law that occurred early in the eighteenth century. Emblem
atic of those changes was the legislative adoption of the lesser sanc
tion of transportation. First and foremost the crime problem was a
problem of penology, the tail of the system that, some hoped, might
wag the dog.78 Important, too, however, was the regularization of jury
77.
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service and its settlement upon people whose judgment could be
trusted and whose interests made them, if not outright dependent, at
least relatively dependable. Beattie here rightly accords great impor
tance to the conscious policy changes of 1 650, which constituted a
turning point in the history of criminal trial jury composition. In Beat
tie's view, the London jury system of the 1 690s both represented a
maturation of mid-seventeenth-century experiments and became, at
least in some respects, the model for the experiments of the eight
eenth century.79 And it brought into the everyday practice of the Lon
don courts the men who would help frame and inaugurate those latter
experiments. Beattie's instinct for the accidents that create new prac
tice and policy-and in short order, ideology-led him to investigate
the circumstances that, in London, first delayed and then produced in
court deliberation.Bo It would appear that even as central authorities
were rationalizing, streamlining, and taming the potentially erratic
impulses of the criminal law and criminal trial procedure, they were,
unintentionally to be sure, creating conditions within which compet
ing influences could continue to exert themselves. We can be certain
that London jurors worked quickly, often guided by their foremen,
and usually decided in accordance with the interests and prejudices of
their caste. But, like jurors in the provinces, they also came to do their
work in the heated and constraining atmosphere of the public do
main.B i
Placing the status and experience of London jurors is of particular
importance. If the typical trial jury was as exalted in the mid eight
eenth century as it had been in the early 1 690s, what, we are led to
wonder, must have been the composition of the special juries that
were sometimes employed in London in seditious libel and other po
litical cases?B2 Surely the special jury cannot have been of a much
higher class; perhaps it was more dependable in the sense that it was
purged of people well known for their dissident views. If so, this tells
us something about the less-than-perfect overlap in interests of au
thorities and the upper middling classes that typically served the Lon
don courts. And even special juries could find against the Crown, so
there were quite evidently limits even to their dependability, at least
79.
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in a specific range of cases.83 Yet another point: In the pamphlets that
debated the law regarding criminal libel, much is made of the ques
tion of London jurors' ability. Can this criticism of jurors be well in
formed, given their position and experience?84 If all that is meant is
that no layman possesses the judge's knowledge of the law, the argu
ment is understandable. Otherwise, it rings quite false. Moreover,
jury proponents sometimes wrote about jurors as though the latter
took part in common political discourse. Although extremely well
off, jurors were-or were alleged to be-fairly common by class stand
ards, part of the large middle class from which Wilkites and others of
a similar cast of mind came. 85 In London, as in the provinces, Eng
land's ruling elites saw the groups that yielded jurors as a class apart
indeed, as without "class."86
More curious still is the role that English jurors in general played in
applying the law in routine cases of property crime. Here they cannot
have been very far from the bench's point of view. Hay's argument is
persuasive.87 Jurors were the employers of those who were accused of
routine felonies, not their co-workers. They owned property or capital
and were set apart from the masses of laborers who were called before
them to be judged. Jurors may well have identified with England's
highest elites insofar as they were part of the natural governing and
property-owning classes. They were an important extension of those
elites, whose members made law in Parliament or on the bench. And
in some respects that law was, as Hay emphasizes, a "class" law that
reflected existing gross inequalities of wealth. 88 From one perspective,
then, jurors represented an instrument of centrally monitored prop
ertied-class power.
But provincial jurors, perhaps more than their London counterparts,
were at the same time members of local elites who had to live with, if
not precisely among, lesser farmers, artisans, and tradesmen, if not
the laboring poor. They were, it would seem, people whose power over
the less well off depended on a mixture of authority and empathy. The
groups from which Essex and Surrey jurors-and even Staffordshire
and Northamptonshire jurors-were drawn could not separate them
selves entirely from their social and economic inferiors, particularly,
83.
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I would venture, from the attitudes of the more substantial of the lat
ter on life-and-death questions. To a significant degree, they were held
in check by groups below them in the social hierarchy, and they were
both inclined and required to satisfy the instincts of those groups for
mercy as well as for retribution, or perhaps more accurately, they
were bound to act in accordance with widespread expectations con
cerning an appropriate regard for the value of a human life. Jurors,
then, were part of a set of institutions that created a fit-albeit only an
approximate one-between widespread social attitudes and the atti
tudes of England's natural rulers. One would do well to pause at this
point to ask about this fit. Why should we suppose there was one at
all? Why was it not closer? What were the "rules" of governing that
made the perspective of the ruling groups diverge from those of much
of society, if one assumes, as I do, that in a special sense the latter both
legitimated and determined the power of the former?89
Society in general was not captured, as the legal elites were, by a no
tion of the rule of law in which a formal theory of consistency loomed
very large. Communal judgment had always been a complex process
in which ad hoc decisions arose from conditions that made them seem
natural, appropriate, of a piece. Royal authorities who came to man
age that process in serious cases of crime instinctively (some would
say, manipulatively) sought to purge that process of the arbitrary and
the incidental. Although authorities in fact accommodated a system
of justice built largely upon exceptions to firmly expressed rules, they
nonetheless created means for articulating fairly precisely the condi
tions in which those exceptions would apply. Social resistance to cap
ital punishment created pressures, for example, for legal rules justi
fying mitigation or outright acquittal on technical grounds, so that
rough agreement on outcome was achieved even while the larger
community and the bench regarded individual cases from very differ
ent perspectives. Doubtless, society came to view many cases on the
authorities' terms: the indictment was "defective"; the high standard
89. By determined I mean limited, in the specific sense that the assize juror
classes drew their views regarding the appropriate use of the gallows at least in part
from groups below them economically and socially, perhaps from something like the
middle third of English society. As suggested in this paragraph of the text, I do not
mean simply that jurors (or those among the highest ruling elites) feared that extensive
recourse to the gallows would lead to political conflict but that a more subtle assimila
tion of attitudes from below resulted from informal contact such as that involved in
the carrying out of local governance. Although such influences, of course, worked
downward as well as upward, I have emphasized the often-neglected upward side of the
process. I have also tried to make clear that the influences from below were partly re
sponsible not only for upper-class notions about when mercy was appropriate but also
for upper-class notions about when it was not.
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of proof had not been met. In the same way, the authorities perhaps
unconsciously adopted social standards regarding merciful treatment
of many specific offenders. But the differing perspectives remained,
each side thinking in its own terms about the resolution of very many
cases. This should come as no surprise. The needs of governors have
always embodied their own special rules and forms.
King's research offers a significant vantage point from which to sur
vey some of the issues I have raised. His conclusions, even when they
are not startling, are indeed penetrating. Although they are based on a
study of a county that was represented by solid middling, rather than
distinctly upper-middling, jurors,90 they seem to me to hold true even
for areas that produced jurors of the latter description. King himself
makes little claim for a true communitarian approach. Essex jurors
were from the local elites, and although only some of them played sig
nificant roles in local government, they held together as a class-or
set of sub-classes-as persons with a variety of life styles and attitudes
that set them apart from both the gentry and the laboring poor.91 If
anything, they were farmer-dominated, quick to condemn sheep
stealers, used to employing farm as well as household servants, and
ready to discipline them. This was a breed that well knew the temp
tations to which the young were vulnerable and that could conclude
as quickly to remove a threat to their order as to be lenient with a
young man understandably (although not excusably) gone astray. One
has the sense of a potentially arbitrary system, the defendant in many
cases owing his life to the happenstance of a few understanding father
figures on the jury. But King argues that jury decisions were in fact
"principled," however they may have appeared to some outside ob
servers.92 King's study makes clear the strength of the claim to good
character, in the sense of widespread acceptance of the rules of the
game, that the leading local orders, broadly defined, exacted.
For whatever reason, Essex jurors came to be even more experi
enced, although not necessarily more exalted in rank, after 1784. In a
move reminiscent of mid-seventeenth-century attempts to rational
ize jury service and to place the responsibility of judgment in the
hands of those who understood the parameters of judicial expecta
tions, Essex j urors came to serve once in three years, as members of
ongoing entities made up very largely of the same people.93 In this the
90.
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Essex jury system was, as far as we know, unique, but the reform may
prove to be an accurate measure of what the national government
hoped generally to achieve. There may have been a parallel in at least
one of the counties Hay has studied.94 By the late eighteenth century,
criticism of arbitrariness had become common, and crime rates were
(or were thought to be) once again on the rise.95 The government per
haps hoped to safeguard the existing system by reducing the occasions
on which jurors might exercise leniency foolishly, thus maximizing
the degree to which measured, selective non-enforcement was applied
in a consistent fashion and blunting the charge of inexperience.96 How
far any of this went toward reducing actual arbitrariness we are unable
to say, but it hardly brought the charges of arbitrariness to a halt or
disguised the fact that the root of the problem lay not with the mech
anisms for selection among offenders but with the process of selection
itself.97
In King's essay we sense that the critical juncture had been reached:
no group of jurors could lend credibility to a system of blanket capital
sanctions to which, given prevailing social attitudes, recourse could
not be had in more than about 10 percent of the cases that came to
trial. The criticism of the system was simply too far advanced and too
plausible. King and Hay note that elite commentators often derided
jurors as illiterate, inexperienced, and of low status, and the two au
thors rightly suggest that this perspective says more about the critics
than about the jurors.98 King takes this point yet a step further; he
suggests that England's highest classes had not so much misgauged
the composition of trial juries as they had come to see the groups that
yielded jurors as representing a force of their own.99 Although it may
be that jurors' occasional recalcitrance in political cases was partly re
sponsible for this view, much of the criticism was aimed at jury be94.
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havior in routine felony cases, and in this context the problem of class
was perhaps of less significance. Indeed, the most persuasive and tell
ing criticism came, I believe, not from those who thought that jurors
were not up to the task set for them, but from those who objected to
the task itself. 1 00 These latter publicists were the new breed of reform
ers, who both criticized jurors for being too merciful and conceded
that, given the prevailing law of sanctions, simple humanity inevita
bly would, and probably ought to, govern jury reactions. 101 There is lit
tle suggestion that these critics-or any critics when they truly con
fronted this problem-thought that even the highest-born were
significantly less susceptible to the impulse to be merciful. Even the
bench and the Crown were said to share in the only-too-human "poor
judgment" that allegedly characterized the system.
The system held on for a time despite the onslaught. In his earlier
work Hay perceptively argued that the ruling elites were blinded to
this particular criticism (or persuaded to weather it) by the advantages
they saw in the power of selective enforcement. 102 This was, no doubt,
one aspect of the mind-set of many late-eighteenth-century proper
tied Englishmen. I have myself suggested that at the same time the
tradition of jury-based mercy drew its strength from other sources as
well, and that those who were less well placed than the authorities
but able nonetheless to play a role in various stages of criminal admin
istration may have viewed the institution of jury trial in quite differ
ent terms. 1 03 The leaders of local communities had always possessed
the "right" to apply the prevailing law regarding life and death; the
jury class held that right not only from the beneficence of the ruling
elite that presided over criminal trials but also as an aspect of its pre
rogative of local governance, which involved managing the affairs of
those who were, among many other things, commonly the victims, as
well as the neighbors, of local bullies and thieves. Moreover, from the
perspective of many of these middling men in their role as jurors (I am
conjecturing), this process of judgment was not arbitrary and did not
have to be defended against the new reformers; it was, because it was
socially based, a natural and predictable process. Only when faith in
the efficacy of this process broke down, especially among London
100. Green, Verdict According to Conscience, chap. 7, sec. 3. This was par
ticularly true, I believe, of Blackstone, Eden, and Romilly, whose writings were widely
circulated and accorded great importance.
101.
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men of commerce in the early nineteenth century, was the system
brought to the brink of reform. 104
Of course, as long as the government could restrict the selection
process to those with substantial property, the highest elite's own
perspective might emerge as the stronger of the two perspectives that
vied for dominance in the minds of those who served as jurors. Hay's
definitive analysis of Staffordshire and Northamptonshire jury panels
suggests that in some times and some places, something close to aris
tocratic control could result. He locates those who served as close to
the very apex of English society. But again, those who served held
places in a relatively local society and had local responsibilities and
sensibilities. Their views on most matters can hardly be taken to be
those of society at large, but their behavior on life-and-death ques
tions in England's close and crowded courtrooms may have reflected
not only elite notions but also the attitudes of much of village society.
We must proce,ed here with caution, but it may well be that the dy
namics of the courtroom-especially when deliberation was under
taken in open court-combined with the tendencies produced by the
unanimity rule further to ensure that even the most exalted jurors
often applied the capital law according to well-understood, wide
spread, and-where much of society deemed it appropriate-dis
tinctly merciful standards. 1 05 I must concede I have overstated the de
gree of agreement within the community that characterized English
criminal administration regarding the imposition of the capital sanc
tion, 106 but just how far I have overstated the case I am still not sure.
Much searching work remains to be done, though it will have to be
impressionistic, for, as I have emphasized, we are dealing here with a
matter of psychology and of constraints barely felt, or felt but misin
terpreted by those who sensed them.
One clue to the distorted perspective of these eighteenth-century
jurors-and earlier ones, no doubt-lies in the importance they all ac
corded to a very high threshold of proof.107 This is itself a difficult con
cept. I have suggested at a number of points that from medieval times
onward the conclusion that there was "insufficient evidence" was the
104. Ibid., 361; L. Radzinowicz, History of English Criminal Law ( l948),
1 :727-32.
105. For King's discussion of the impact of the unanimity rule, see chap. 9,
text at nn. 16�4, 1 72; for his discussion of courtroom dynamics, see ibid., at nn. 16469. My own discussion is speculative and, in its invocation of "widespread" views, goes
beyond the conclusions that King draws.
106.
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result of a variety of factors, only some of which we would identify as
strictly a matter of the quantity of proof. Critics saw the "high stand
ard" as irrational, too high by far, and they correctly explained its ex
istence in terms of resistance to the use of the gallows, 108 but they
often underestimated its importance to the administration of the
criminal law. The high standard of proof and the sense often experi
enced in close and crowded courtrooms that it had not been reached
were crucial to the system of trial by jury as it worked for centuries.
They allowed jurors to conceal from themselves the extent to which
myriad other concerns determined the outcome of their deliberations.
Perhaps the most significant of these other concerns was the reputa
tion of the defendant, and reputation had to do not only with the like
lihood that the defendant had indeed acted as charged but also with
more open-ended matters of just deserts that jurors could not easily
confront as such. 109 The high standard was a powerful legal and psy
chological force. It was, to be sure, an instrument of justice, indeed of
circumspection and delicacy, 1 1 0 a pervasive rationalization that held
people of all orders fixed in their respect for the system and their place
in it. It was also, however, a surrogate for the implicit understanding,
which the bench shared, that general social attitudes regarding the
value of human life could not-indeed, should not-be breached. It
tended to deceive the English about the nature of their law, their legal
system, and their biases. It produced a powerful ethic of supposed le
gal certainty and consistency, but its true sources lay in an uneasy
combination of responses to the needs, both downward-projecting and
upward-flowing, of politics and social existence.

Research on trial jury composition, as it now stands, suggests that the
English criminal trial jury, especially in cases of felony, was domi
nated by local elites, men who played a significant governing role in
everyday life at the level of the ward, parish, or hundred. The assize
criminal trial jury forged a connection between the central authorities
1 08. Ibid., chap. 7, sec. 3.
109. Ibid., 282-85. See also P.J.R. King, "Decision-Makers and Decision
Making in English Criminal Law, 1 750--1820," Historical fournal 27 ( 1984): 25-28. I re
serve for another occasion discussion of a closely related phenomenon that I believe
played a significant role in the resolution of capital cases in the eighteenth century (and
since) : the tendency of jurors to take into account-consciously or otherwise-the de
gree to which, as jurors perceived the matter, offenders had acted under the influence of
circumstances beyond their control. I allude to this point in Verdict According to Con
science, 301-2, 3 16, 383.
l lO.

Hay, "Property, Authority and the Criminal Law, " 49.

Eleven

Thomas A. Green

39 6
and the level of government below county leadership, a level with
which county officials always had to deal. When the hundredal re
quirement broke down, or was jettisoned, county officials turned to
persons of the same class as those who had served earlier, taking them
from wherever in the county they might be obtained. If the persons to
whom they turned were therefore not dependent upon the politics of
the specific locales of the cases they heard, they nonetheless reflected
the needs and interests of similarly situated local elites elsewhere in
the county. The tie between Crown and countryside reflected in the
jury was an important instrument that gave thrust to central initia
tives and prestige to local middle-class men. Central authorities both
coopted the latter and were, I believe, coopted by them. We are little
closer than we were at the outset to being able to describe the power
relationship in which judge and jury were locked. But that is as much
because that relationship was two-sided and contradictory as because
the evidence has been lost.1 u
We are, however, better able to identify the main turning points in
the history of trial jury composition. The partial outline of events I
formulated elsewhere has been significantly modified and elaborated
to produce a revised version that can be summarized as follows. At the
outset, jury service was aimed at knights and very substantial free
holders, who were expected to draw upon the knowledge of those
lesser landholders whom they trusted or whom they could coerce into
cooperating with them. Presentment was the crucial stage, and when
a second, final resolution came to be made by jury, it proved to be
dominated by those who had served as presenters. To encourage ac
ceptance of this ultimate verdict, the Crown allied with the present
ers the more substantial men of the vills nearest to the location of the
offense . Thus began the history of a trial jury that, although elitist in
the most local context, was composed of men who sometimes ranked
below the elites at the hundredal level and nearly always ranked be
low those who governed the county. The structure of the eyre allowed
for continued domination by hundredal leadership, and this under the
eye of county potentates at gaol delivery. Hundred representatives
were less constrained from above, but their position within the local
elites was mixed. The county and hundred officials who supplied the
panels increasingly relied on local officials-village constables, coro1 1 1 . Joan R. Kent has approached the problem of the relationship between
the central government and village communities in early modem England in The Eng
lish Village Constable, 1580--1 642: A Social and Administrative Study ( 198 7). Kent's
study provides an excellent context for understanding the role of the administration of
the criminal law in the development of the English state.
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ners, and the like. By the later Middle Ages, not only was the jury less
likely to come from the hundred wherein the offense had been com
mitted, but it was also more likely to contain members of merely vil
lage elites rather than the grandest men of the hundred. With the in
crease of small farmers who laid claim to a place among these local
elites, the jury came to be identified squarely with the yeoman class.
By the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries there were
rarely many gentry on the trial jury even at the assizes. For the gentry,
powerful representation upon, and direct domination of, the grand
jury had become standard. Ultimately, an important social distinc
tion between service on the two juries, grand and petty, became fixed;
by the late seventeenth century there was a firm upper limit on the
status of persons eligible (in social, not legal, terms) for trial jury serv
ice .
The middling groups, then, constituted the trial jury class. In na
tional terms its ranks were small, and it sometimes included quite
substantial farmers, and artisans and tradesmen of independent stand
ing in commerce, although these latter groups shaded off more grad
ually into the ranks of the lesser artisanry and craftsmen, who were
themselves above, but not entirely separate from, the better off of the
laboring·poor. From the perspective of the authorities, jury service by
this middling class was appropriate as long as those who served were
trustworthy, experienced, and inclined to follow the advice and incli
nations of their betters. In a sense, the authorities settled for a "yeo
man" jury that seemed to embody gentry instincts. Reforms during
the middle and late decades of the seventeenth century stressed both
formal property qualifications and a regularization of service, and
they began-but only began-to undermine the dependence of the ju
ror class upon local rather than national interests. As the rich and poor
separated, jurors increasingly represented groups that were well above
the great majority of defendants yet still far below England's wealth
iest elite. The late-seventeenth- and eighteenth-century jury re
mained, to an important extent, a mediating body that was at once
drawn from the higher ranks and still (although decreasingly)
hemmed in by its involvement in local life. It was, as always, drawn
from the propertied classes, and property was more and more a "state
ment" as well as an economic and political resource. There were per
haps differences from county to county regarding the sheer represen
tation of wealth deciles on assize trial juries. Most often, jurors came
from the top third or quarter of society; if some ranged into the high
est decile, some others came from below the top third, although rarely
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if ever from the bottom half of society. This much we now know of
the pre-Victorian criminal assize trial jury's economic status.
To an important degree, jury composition remained fairly stable
while other aspects of criminal administration changed around it. Al
though some of these changes were themselves direct responses to the
jury, most of them were responses to factors that implicated the jury
only indirectly if at all. Historians have associated the rise of an in
dependent prosecution with the decline in late medieval England of a
social organization that made self-informing possible. Probably one
ought to reconsider this view. There was, perhaps, a potential for an
independent prosecution at a very early date, and victims may have
pushed themselves forward rather than having been impelled by the
breakdown of self-informing. As I have suggested, it was concern with
serious crime that governed the decisions of Crown and bench; their
treatment of lesser, nominally capital offenses emerged as a byprod
uct of new capacities for control rather than evolving as a consciously
designed policy. Once effected, however, the elaboration of the pros
ecution allowed in turn for the control of juries in ways that may not
have been intended. At the same time, enhanced royal control threat
ened an imbalance between the state and the individual that threw
the jury's role into a special kind of relief. As self-protective and sin
cerely believed rationalizations of its own position and authority, the
state emphasized what had long been mainly the case: that conviction
at a capital level required virtually absolute proof, and that the bench
stood ready as counsel to the accused. The practice of reprieve for an
"unsafe" verdict partially nullified jury convictions against the evi
dence, an ironic response to the growth of an independent prosecu
tion. Thus jury powers and their limits and the place of the jury in the
constitution and in historical myth all owed their existence to the
tensions created by the growth of government capacity as it pressed
upon the once largely open-ended power of governance by local com
munity elites. The idea of a prophylactic against government over
reach-the principle of noncoercion-cannot be entirely separated
from that of a safeguard against jury-based lynching or simple error.
The struggle for control of jury ideology involved a more two-sided,
rhetorical invocation of the right of the defendant than is sometimes
recognized.
In such a climate it was inevitable that multiple perspectives on the
jury would compete for a place in the English culture's idea of the
criminal trial jury. Further regularization and control of the jury
would proceed upon an argument for consistency and fairness. Even
as late as the eighteenth century, appeals to a right to find the law
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would lay claim to the notion of a simple law evident to all men of
conscience. To some, the jury would seem an unlearned and rustic
mob; to others it would appear so much an arm of landed elites as to
be a perversion of the very notion of communal judgment. Both of
these perspectives were, of course, true. That is what made the jury so
powerful an institution, one fluid enough in the impressions society
had of it to weather all attacks. It was both the cutting edge of reform
and the bastion of the status quo, and those who reviled it in one con
text lauded it in another. In that climate, one might ask, did subtle
changes in composition matter very much?
Of course, changes in composition did matter. They affected actual
behavior as well as perceptions of that behavior. The essays presented
here not only help to establish who served in the capacity of criminal
trial jurors, noting some substantial differences over time and place,
they also link composition to behavior in ways that suggest how, both
at the micro and the macro level, who sat could mean who lived and
who died. There were, however, limits to this compositional effect.
These limits inhered not only in the idea or ideas about the jury that
prevailed in society at large; they resided also, and perhaps more sig
nificantly, in the ideas that jurors-representing the jury as an insti
tution-had of themselves. Behavior was not solely a function of class
or status or interest in any narrow, material sense; it was crucially a
function of self-image and of one's own perceived role in national gov
ernance, in local society, and in the constitution. As jury composition
altered, so too did ideas about the jury, but given ongoing traditions of
thought, this process of change was necessarily gradual, and its im
pact on jurors within the age-old context of the ritual of determining
life or death must have been all the more subject to ideological fric
tion. Perhaps even highly placed jurors unconsciously acted out a
kind of mediatory role on a basis far different from that on which the
authorities intended them to proceed. It is even possible that the
higher the central authorities raised jurors, the further those authori
ties expanded the process by which England's national elites gained
experience in seeing human behavior from the perspective of society's
wide and troubled base.
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